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NOTES
The Expanded Federal Question: On The
"Independent Viability" of Declaratory Claims
In 1934, Congress passed the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
(FDJA).I The FDJA created a new federal remedy, 2 the declaratory
judgment, which permits controversies to be settled before laws are
violated, contracts are breached,3 or unnecessary damage has ac-
crued.4 The declaratory remedy also acts as a milder alternative to
the "strong medicine" of the injunction.5 Originally the FDJA was
used to test the -constitutionality of state criminal statutes.6 Later,
the FDJA became. significant in suits claiming federal preemption of
state law.7
In enacting the FDJA, Congress afforded federal courts a new
remedy but did not enlarge federal subject matter jurisdiction.8 The
Supreme Court has insisted that the established constitutional, 9 stat-
utory, 10 and procedural requirements" of federal question jurisdic-
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1976). § 2201 provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, .. any court of the United
States. . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and
shall be reviewable as such.
2 "The principle involved in this form of procedure is to confer upon the courts the
power to exercise in some instances preventive relief; a function now performed rather clum-
sily by our equitable proceedings and inadequately by the law courts." H.R. REP. No. 1264,
73d. Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
3 See, e.g., Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Consolidated Gas Util. Co., 190 F.2d 985, 989 (10th
Cir. 1951).
4 See, e.g., E. Edelman & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 680 (1937).
5 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974).
6 1d; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 109, 111-15 (1971).
7 Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 101 S. Ct. 1309 (1981); Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rts. Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dep't., 440
U.S. 519 (1979); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Super Tire Eng'r Co. v.
McCorkle, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); Glendale Fed. Say. &
Loan v. Fox, 481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
8 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 109, 111-15 (1971); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 337 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950). As used in this note, the term "federal jurisdiction" shall
refer solely to federal subject matter jurisdiction as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
9 U.S. CONST. art. III. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
10 See text accompanying notes 21-24 infla.
11 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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tion be satisfied before a federal court may adjudicate the merits of a
declaratory claim.' 2 Nevertheless the FDJA has greatly complicated
federal question jurisdiction. When faced with a declaratory claim
seeking constitutional 3 immunity from a state law cause of action,
federal courts have struggled to apply the various guidelines gov-
erning federal question jurisdiction. Although established jurisdic-
tional guidelines bar federal jurisdiction over a claim which is
asserted "in the nature of a defense," 14 the First,' 5 Fifth, 16 and
Ninth' 7 Circuits have upheld federal jurisdiction over declaratory
claims which assert that federal law preempts a state cause of action.
By upholding federal jurisdiction based upon the "independent via-
bility" of the declaratory claims, the courts have introduced a new
rule expanding federal question jurisdiction.
This note examines the emerging "independent viability rule"
and considers its effect on existing federal jurisdictional doctrine.
Part I reviews the constitutional, statutory, and judicial limitations
on federal question jurisdiction. Part II examines the specialized ju-
risdictional rules governing federal declaratory actions. Part III ana-
lyzes four federal appellate cases applying the independent viability
rule. Part IV assesses the soundness of the independent viability rule,
and Part V proposes that the federal courts uniformly accept the
emerging rule.
I. Historical Limits to Federal Question Jurisdiction
Article III of the Constitution of the United States is the source
of federal judicial power. 18 Section one vests all judicial power in a
Supreme Court and empowers Congress to ordain and establish in-
ferior courts. 19 Section two extends federal jurisdiction to "all cases,
in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
12 See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
13 Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that "the laws of the United
States . ..shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI. The preemption
doctrine is the heart of "our federalism." Given a "collision" between an Act of Congress and
a state statute, the state law must "yield to the law of Congress." Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824). See note 7 supra. See generalfy Note, A Framework for Preemption Analy-
siS, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978-79); Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground- A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
14 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
15 First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979).
16 Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978).
17 Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d. 1295 (9th Cir. 1975), aj'd sub. nom. Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604
F.2d 1256, (1979).
18 U.S. CONsT. art. III.
19 Id § 1.
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United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority .. ".. -o Pursuant to its constitutional power, Con-
gress created the federal district courts2t and granted them original
jurisdiction in all "civil actions wherein the matter in controversy
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."22
Although the courts have not developed a completely satisfac-
tory test for determining when a claim in fact "arises under" federal
law,23 the Supreme Court, through a number of decisions, has estab-
lished guidelines governing federal question jurisdiction.2 4 The first
of these cases, Osbom v. The Bank of the United States,25 is most signifi-
cant for establishing the constitutional limits of "arising under" juris-
diction.2 6 Since Congress first enacted a federal question statute in
1875, the Supreme Court has focused on the meaning of "arising
under" in the statute rather than in the Constitution.2 7 The Court
20. Id § 2.
21 The judicial power of the federal courts is grounded, in general, in two separate statu-
tory provisions governing subject matter jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), the
federal courts have original jurisdiction over "diversity of citizenship" cases. Under the "fed-
eral question" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have original jurisdic-
tion over certain cases presenting issues primarily rooted in federal law. See Gully v. First
Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 17-22 (3d ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT]; Mishkin, The Federal "Question"in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (Supp. 1981). Though the statutory basis for federal question
jurisdiction has traditionally been qualified by a requisite monetary "amount in controversy,"
this requirement has recently been eliminated. Id
23 Professor Mishkin has devised a succinct test which states that "a substantial claim
founded 'directly' upon federal law" is necessary to invoke original federal question jurisdic-
tion. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 165, 168
(1953). Several courts have approved of this test. See, e.g., Keaukaha-Panaewa Comm'n v.
Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 588 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1978); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Marti-
nez, 519 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1975).
Further attempts have been made to state precisely when a case does arise under federal
law. One recent example: "[A] suit arises under federal law whenever the plaintiff's com-
plaint discloses actual, substantial reliance - at the time the judicial power is invoked - on
a proposition of law that touches on federal primary relationships." Note, The Outer Limits of
"Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 978, 979 (1979).
24 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); People of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
288 U.S. 476 (1933); Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248 (1885); Pacific R.R. Removal Cases,
115 U.S. 1 (1885); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. (6 Otto) 199 (1877); Bank of
the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
25 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
26 In Osbom, Justice Marshall construed broadly the arising under language of the Con-
stitution. Under the Osborn test, federal jurisdiction existed whenever an element of federal
law was an ingredient of the cause of action. Id. at 824.
27 Professor Wright has argued that this statutory construction is entirely proper and
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has interpreted the statutory "arising under" language more restric-
tively than it interpreted the constitutional language in Osbom; this
restrictive interpretation has narrowed significantly the scope of fed-
eral question jurisdiction.2 8 In Guly v. The First National Bank in Me-
ridian 29 Justice Cardozo assessed federal question jurisdiction by
distinguishing basic federal issues from collateral federal issues and
necessary federal controversies from merely potential federal contro-
versies. 30 Although further attempts have been made to develop a
succinct test for original federal question jurisdiction, none has been
universally embraced by the federal courts. 31 Later cases have estab-
lished, however, that the "arising under" requirement will be satis-
fied if a federal right or immunity is a basic element of the plaintiff's
cause of action.32
Foremost among common law restrictions on federal question
jurisdiction is the requirement that the federal issue appear on the
face of a well-pleaded complaint.33 A determination of jurisdiction
by examination of the plaintiffs initial pleadings is consistent with
the notion that a court must first possess power over a case before it
can require responsive pleadings. 34 A federal issue raised solely in the
distinguishable from the Osborn constitutional construction. C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 64-
66.
28 Id
29 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
30 Id at 118.
31 C. WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 67. Because subject matter jurisdiction may never be
waived, when the federal courts have assumed jurisdiction over any federal question case the
"arising under" requirement has been satisified.
32 "[C]ases raising a serious question whether jurisdiction exists are comparatively
rare ..... It is the exceptional case in which the meaning of arising under poses any serious
problem." 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
Jurisdiction § 3562, at 398 (1976)(Supp. 1981).
The most formidable barrier to federal question jurisdiction is not § 133 1, but rather the
wealth ofjudge-made law which has interpreted the statute and limited its proper use. "The
existing doctrines as to when a case raises a federal question are neither analytical nor entirely
logical, but a considerable body of case law has been built up on this subject that is reason-
ably well understood by courts and litigants, and that works well in practice." AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURSIDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS, p. 179 (1969). Therefore, although a precise definition of "arising under" has not
been articulated, the operative limits of arising under jurisdiction have been established by a
vast body of case law.
33 This rule was first applied in Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. (6 Otto)
199 (1877), and has been applied in modern times. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
415 U.S. 125, 127-28 (1974).
34 See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JURIS-
DICTION § 3566 (1976) (Supp. 198 1). An inquiry into federal question jurisdiction, therefore,
must begin and end within the four corners of the plaintiffs complaint. Id
[June 1982]
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defendant's answer is insufficient to support federal jurisdiction. 35
Likewise, a complaint which raises a federal issue in anticipation of a
particular defense does not establish federal question jurisdiction. 36
In most cases, the well-pleaded complaint rule contributes conven-
ience and certainty to the federal courts' analysis of jurisdiction,
avoiding the somewhat inequitable results which obtain when a case
is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction at a more advanced stage of litiga-
tion.37 Nonetheless, the rule has created a great deal of uncertainty
when applied in federal declaratory judgment actions.
II. Federal Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Claims
Under the FDJA, a party to a justiciable controversy may peti-
tion the federal district court to adjudicate his rights and liabilities.3 8
The Supreme Court has established that, although the FDJA creates
a noncoercive 39 federal remedy, it does not expand federal subject
matter jurisdiction.40 The article III "case or controversy" require-
ment4' as well as the section 1331 "arising under" requirement 42
must at all times be respected. 43 Nevertheless, litigants have used the
FDJA to test the limits of federal question jurisdiction, thus raising
the danger that subject matter jurisdiction may be invoked
improperly.
In order to fully respect the "arising under" requirement, federal
35 Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
36 This rule was first applied in Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888). It
has been consistently applied eve"in-e. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415
U.S. 125 (1974); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 3007 (1981); Smart v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp
1147 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Michigan Say. & Loan League v. Francis, 490 F. Supp. 892 (E.D.
Mich. 1980).
37 Note, FederalJurisdiction over De/aratog, Suits, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 984-86 (1979).
Se Cohen, The Broken Com,ass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "DirectS" Under Federal Law,
115 U. PA. L. REa. 890 (1967).
38 See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
39 A "non-coercive" remedy establishes the rights and liabilities of a party but does not
compel or enjoin further specific conduct. I f,
40 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-74 (1950). A federal court
may not condition declaratory relief on a showing that a coercive remedy is possible. Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 115-18 (1971); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Roe, 102 F.2d 28 (8th Cir.
1939).
41 U.S. CONST. art. III. The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of the
FDJA in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). The Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Act, stating that article III is satisfied as long as declaratory relief is limited
to cases of "real and substantial controversy". Id at 241.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. 1981).
43 Jurisdiction may also be based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
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courts must apply the well-pleaded complaint rule.44 The rule, how-
ever, is often difficult to apply in declaratory actions. The plaintiff in
a declaratory action may assert federal rights that, in an action for
traditional remedies, would not have appeared on the face of a well-
pleaded complaint.45 For example, the declaratory complaint may
raise a claim which, absent declaratory procedure, would appear as a
reply to the defendant's expected defense.46 Similarly, the declara-
tory plaintiff may, in effect, "respond" to a state law cause of action
by seeking a declaration of his federal rights.47 In actions for tradi-
tional, non-coercive remedies, neither claim would satisfy the well-
pleaded complaint rule. Prior to the FDJA's enactment, federal ju-
risdiction would have been improper.
To help ensure that the FDJA not expand subject matter juris-
diction,48 the Supreme Court modified the well-pleaded complaint
rule for declaratory actions. In Skely Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ,49
the Court rejected the suggestion that federal courts should apply the
well-pleaded complaint rule mechanically to declaratory complaints
and grant jurisdiction if a complaint raises any federal claim.50 The
Court instead adopted a narrower version of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule.51 Under the modified rule, a federal court may consider
a request for declaratory relief only if a complaint in a hypothetical52
suit brought absent the declaratory remedy would contain a substan-
44 See notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
45 The realistic position of the parties is reversed in a declaratory suit. "A petition for a
declaration, however, may frequently assert as a cause of action what would be a defense or a
reply in a conventional suit." Developments in the Law - DecdaratogJudgments - 19411-1949, 62
HARV. L. REV. 787, 802 (1949).
46 See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
47 See, e.g., Home Fed. Say. & Loan v. Insurance Dep't, 571 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978);
Allegheny Airlines v. Pennylvania Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972). See also
Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood, Inc., 562 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1977); McCorkle v. First Pa. Banking
& Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1972); Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc.,
448 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
48 See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 109, 111-15 (1971).
49 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
50 Developments in the Law - DeclaratogyJudgments - 1941-1949, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787,
802-03 (1949).
51 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672-73 (1950).
52 If the declaratory relief were sought by a defendant in a pending state proceeding, the
court would look to the complaint in the state proceeding in order to establish jurisdiction
over the dispute. If no suit were yet brought, the court would invent a hypothetical coercive
suit and examine its complaint for the necessary federal question. Therefore, the nature of
the actual or threatened controversy determines the existence of federal question jurisdiction.
Id; Developments in the Law -Dearatog'Judgments- 1941-1949, 62 HARv. L. REV. 787, 802-
03 (1949).
[June 19821
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tial federal question.5 3 Federal jurisdiction, therefore, may be im-
proper despite the averment of a federal issue on the face of a
declaratory complaint. 54 Indeed, the Court in Skely Oil held that the
declaratory plaintiff's federal claim was, in effect, a reply to an antici-
pated federal defense.5 5 The Court, focusing on the true nature of
the controversy, found that the hypothetical complaint did not raise
the essential federal question.5 6 Thus, jurisdiction was improper.
In Public Service Commission v. Wcoff Co. ,57 the Court addressed
Skelly Oil's application to situations in which the declaratory plaintiff
sues to establish a federal defense to a state law cause of action. The
plaintiff in Wycof' had commenced a declaratory action in federal
district court. 58 The complaint had sought 1) the court's declaration
that the Wycoff Company's transportation of motion picture film
over interstate highways within Utah was an activity within the
scope of interstate commerce; and 2) the court's injunction of Public
Service Commission of Utah's interference with transporation in in-
terstate commerce. 59 The Supreme Court dismissed the request for
injunctive relief on constitutional grounds, holding that the defend-
ant's "threatened or probable act" 60 did not present the requisite
"actual controversy."' 6' The company had adduced insufficient evi-
dence of any state administrative or judicial action seeking to pro-
hibit its activity.62 Noting that the dispute had not "matured to a
point where we can see what, if any, concrete controversy will de-
velop,"'63 the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the declara-
53 If federal jurisdiction is determined on the basis of pleadings in a hypothetical coercive
action, then only those declaratory cases which would also have attained jurisdiction in coer-
cive form will be allowed. 48 U. CINN. L. REV. 150, 153 (1979).
54 Home Fed. Say. & Loan v. Insurance Dep't, 571 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978); Allegheny
Airlines v. Pennsylvania Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972).
55 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. at 672-73.
56 Id
57 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
58 Id at 239-40. The action was brought in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah.
59 Id
60 Id at 241.
61 Id
62 Id at 246-47. The Commission had, in fact, filed a petition in Utah state court seeking
to enjoin the Wycoff Company from intrastate operation. "[B]ut that process was never
served and nothing in the record tells us what happened to this action." Id at 245. In his
dissent, Justice Douglas considered it significant that the suit was pending in the Utah court.
Id at 251-52 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63 Id at 245.
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
tory claim.64 By declining jurisdiction on ripeness grounds, the
Court did not have to reach the issue ofjurisdiction over the declara-
tory suit.65 Nevertheless, the Court in Wof suggested in dicta that
jurisdiction would have been improper because the complaint sought
to establish a federal defense to a threatened state court action:
Where the complaint in an action for declaratory judgment seeks in
essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened state
court action, it is the character of the threatened action, and not of
the defense, which will determine whether there is federal question
jurisdiction in the District Court. If the cause of action, which the
declaratory defendant threatens to assert, does not itself involve a
claim under federal law, it is doubtful if a federal court may enter-
tain an action for a declaratory judgment establishing a defense to
that claim. This is dubious even though the declaratory complaint
sets forth a claim of federal right, if that right is in reality in the
nature of a defense to a threatened cause of action. Federal courts
will not seize litigations from state courts merely because one, nor-
mally a defendant, goes to federal court to begin his federal defense
before the state court begins the case under state law.
66
Following the dicta in Wycof, many lower federal courts have
held that a party who commences, 67 or is about to commence, 68 a
state court action based upon state law may not be haled into federal
court as a defendant in a declaratory suit based on federal law.69 In
Home Federal Savings and Loan v. Insurance Department of Iowa ,70 the
Eighth Circuit declined to exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory ac-
tion challenging on federal preemption grounds a state agency's at-
tempt to regulate a savings and loan association. In Allegheny Airlines
v. Pennylvania Public Service Commission, 71 the Third Circuit held that a
64 "We conclude that this suit cannot be entertained as one for injunction and should not
be continued as one for a declaratory judgment." Id at 249.
65 "Since this case should be dismissed in any event, it is not necessary to determine
whether, on the the record, the alleged controversy over an action that may be begun in state
court would be maintainable ... " Id at 248-49.
66 .1d at 248.
67 See, e.g., Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Insurance Dep't, 571 F.2d 423 (8th Cir.
1978); Milprint, Inc. v. Curwood Inc., 562 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Monks v. Heth-
erington, 573 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1978).
68 See, e.g., Nuclear Eng'r Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1981); Madsen v. Pruden-
tial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3007 (1981).
69 See, e.g., Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 448 F.2d 1328 (3d. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972); McCorkle v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 459 F.2d 243
(4th Cir. 1972); Product Eng'r & Mfg., Inc. v. Barnes, 424 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1970); Arden-
Mayfair, Inc. v. Lovart Corp, 434 F. Supp. 580 (D. Del. 1977); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. McReynolds, 297 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Ky. 1969).
70 571 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978).
71 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972) (dictum), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
[,June 1982]
[Vol. 57:609]
declaratory claim seeking to invalidate state regulation of airlines on
federal preemption grounds must fail for lack of jurisdiction. 72 In
both Home Federal and Allegheny, the averment of a federal question,
rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, was insufficient
to confer federal question jurisdiction because the averment consti-
tuted only a defense to a real or hypothetical state law claim. 73 Thus
a strict application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in declaratory
actions, as expressed in Skely Oil and Wycoff, has prevented federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over declaratory claims challeng-
ing the constitutionality of state actions.
III. The Development of the Independent Viability Rule
Three federal appellate courts have upheld jurisdiction over
Wycof-ftype declaratory claims. While attempting to distinguish the
Wcoffdicta, the First,74 Fifth,75 and Ninth 76 Circuits have developed
the "independent viability" rule. This rule states that a declaratory
claim which is viable in its own right will satisfy jurisdictional re-
quirements even if asserted in the nature of a defense. The three
federal appellate courts have applied the independent viability rule
solely where a complainant, faced with a pending or clearly
threatened state action, brings a federal suit against a state official
seeking a declaration that federal law preempts state law. Under the
rule, federal jurisdiction is based on the allegation that the declara-
tory claim of preemption arises under federal law.77
A. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker
In Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 78 the Ninth Circuit distinguished
W4ycoffby inquiring into the policy aims inherent in the 1'coft2 dicta
and noting their inapplicability. 79 By characterizing the cause of ac-
tion as 1) ripe for adjudication and 2) capable of being asserted as an
72 Id at 241.
73 Id; Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Insurance Dep't, 571 F.2d 423, 426-27 (8th Cir.
1978).
74 First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1979).
75 Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978).
76 Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), afd
mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, (9th Cir. 1975), ajd
sub. nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
77 In all cases, the state proceedings are either actually pending or clearly threatened, so
that the declaratory claim is capable of being construed as "in the nature of a defense."
78 530 F.2d 1295 (9th cir. 1975), affdsub. nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519
(1977).
79 Id at 1303-06.
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affirmative as well as a defensive claim, the Rath court distinguished
W off and created the independent viability distinction. 80  In Rath
California officials inspected Rath Packing Company meat products,
found that the company had overstated the products' net weight,
and issued an off-sale order.81 In response to California's allegations
in state court that the company's actions violated state law,82 Rath
Packing Company brought suit in federal district court seeking a
declaration that federal law preempted state regulations.8 3 The fed-
eral district court granted the company's motion for summary
judgment. 84
On appeal, the state contended that the company's attempt to
use a federal declaratory judgment as a defense to a state action was
barred by W1coff.85 The Ninth Circuit found that although the com-
pany could have raised the declaratory claim as a defense to the state
action, 86 the company also could have asserted offensively a federal
preemption action to seek redress for any harm caused by the off-sale
order.87 The court held that the federal action based on preemption
had ripened into a substantial federal controversy due to the off-sale
order.88 The federal declaratory claim was therefore not dependent
on the state litigation,89 and the federal court had jurisdiction over it.
B. Braniff International, Inc. v. Florida Public Service
Commission
In Braniff International, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commisnszn,90
Southern Airways petitioned a federal court to declare a state statute
invalid and to enjoin its further enforcement. 91 Southern alleged
80 Id Since other federal appellate courts have relied on these two factors when seeking
to distinguish 4cof, the distinction may now fairly be called a rule.
81 Id at 1298-1301. An "off-sale" order is an administrative order that, if disobeyed,
would lead to an enforcement proceeding.
82 People v. Rath Packing Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 56, 118 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1974). The
California statute allegedly violated was CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 12211. Rath Packing
Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1302 (9th Cir. 1975).
83 Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 357 F. Supp. 529 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
84 Id at 535.
85 Rath Packing co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1303-06 (9th Cir. 1975).
86 "That Rath's claim is or can be the basis for a defense to the state court actions states a
mere truism. ... Id at 1306.
87 "Rath's claims have a vitality in the absence of the litigation in state court; Rath had a
right to a federal forum before the institution of the state court actions." Id at 1305.
88 "The off-sale orders themselves are sufficient state action to create an actual contro-
versy." Id
89 "The present controversy was not created by the institution of the state court actions
against Rath, but arose independently thereof by virtue of the off-sale orders." Id
90 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978).
91 Id at 1102.
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that the defendant Commission's attempt to regulate interstate air-
lines pursuant to the questioned state statute violated the Supremacy
and Commerce clauses of the Constitution.92 Finding that the action
sought "merely to obtain for plaintiffs a federal defense, '93 the fed-
eral district court held that the sole claim relevant to jurisdiction in-
volved only state law issues. 94  Following Wcof and Allegheny
Airlines,95 the court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 96 The Fifth Circuit reversed:97 "That appellants' con-
stitutional claim ever may be a defense to the Commission's actions
states a mere truism; it is not, under the circumstances, a limitation
upon the power of the district court to entertain the controversy
before it."' 98 After discussing the Wycof dicta in detail, the court
questioned the dicta's continued validity and established an excep-
tion to its application:
[W]e hold that where a party seeks injunctive and declaratory relief
based upon the unconstitutionality of a state statute, and where
there are no other concrete impediments to a proper exercise of fed-
eral question jurisdiction, the mere fact that the constitutional
claims might be raised before a state administrative body charged
with enforcement of the statute does not alone deprive the court of
jurisdiction.99
Federal courts will not settle unripe controversies; indeed the
Court in WIcoff" had declined to grant injunctive relief on ripeness
grounds.'00 The Fifth Circuit characterized Wycoff as having re-
flected a "concern that a plaintiff not be allowed. . . to proceed...
in a case which otherwise could not be heard in federal court."''1
While in Wcof there had been no evidence of threatened state ac-
tion, Branif involved an impending action by the Florida Public
Service Commission.10 2 Thus the Fifth Circuit in Braniff found that
the existence of "adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and
92 Id
93 Id at 1103.
94 Id
95 319 F.Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aj'd, 465 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 410 U.S.
943 (1973).
96 Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100, 1103 (5th Cir. 1978).
97 Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978).
98 Id at 1106.
99 d
100 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 240-41 (1952).
101 Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100, 1106 (5th Cir. 1978).
102 Southern had been ordered to show cause why "it should not be penalized by fine
and/or ordered to cease and desist from future violations. . . ." Id at 1102.
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reality to warrant relief" 10 3 ensured a ripe article 111104 controversy.
C. First Federal Savings & Loan v. Greenwald
In First Federal Savings and Loan v. Greenwald,10 5 the First Circuit
considered a district court holding that federal preemption of state
banking laws presented a federal questioi sufficient to support re-
moval jurisdiction. 0 6 On appeal from the Federal District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, the First Circuit recognized the un-
resolved federal jurisdictional questions involved in asserting federal
preemption as a defense to a state law claim.'0 7 The court declined
to resolve the uncertainty, noting that jurisdiction could stand even if
removal were improper. 0 8
In a footnote, however, the court explained how it may have
resolved the jurisdictional question. 0 9 The court noted that the con-
flicting requirements of the state and federal regulations caused harm
to the regulated parties and ripened the controversy.1 0 The contro-
versy was thus justiciable regardless of whether the Commissioner
brought a state action."' Therefore, the plaintiff savings and loan
associations could have brought the declaratory action as an original
federal action. 12 The claim could have been brought affirmatively,
103 Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d at 1105 (quoting Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
104 U.S. CONST. art. III.
105 591 F.2d 417 (1979).
106 Id at 422. The jurisdictional issues involved in Greenwald arose in a complex factual
setting. The Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks commenced a state court action against
the Association seeking declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the interpretation and en-
forcement of Massachusetts banking laws. As an affirmative defense, the Association averred
that the the Massachusetts laws were preempted by federal regulations promulgated under
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). The defendant Association removed
the case to federal district court and counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief. Jurisdiction
was based on the federal issues "arising under" RESPA. An identical claim was asserted by
the Association as declaratory plaintiff in a separate civil action against the Commissioner.
Both actions were consolidated into one district court suit with the Association as party plain-
tiff. Id at 419-22.
107 Id at 422-23.
108 The rationale, as articulated by the court, was that "the district court clearly had
jurisdiction over the associations' separate declaratory judgment action which involved the
same issues and was consolidated with the Commissioner's action for hearing and decision.
The court added that "[t]he matter of preemption and related federal issues were the focal
point of the declaratory judgment suit, hence federal question jurisdiction [was proper]." Id
at 423.
109 Id at 423 n.8.
110 Id
111 Id
112 "[The regulations in conflict] would have presented a justiciable controversy even if
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to vindicate a federal right, as well as defensively, to seek immunity
from a state cause of action. Since the declaratory claim was not
solely capable of being asserted "in the nature of a defense," it had
the requisite vitality and met the requirements of federal subject
matter jurisdiction.t 3
D. Conference of Federal Savings & Loan Associations v. Stein
The Ninth Circuit applied the independent viability rule most
recently in Conference of Federal Savings and Loan Associations v. Stein." t4
In Stein, the California Secretary of Business and Transportation di-
rected that all lending institutions which operated in California
would be required to abide by the California Housing Financial Dis-
crimination Act of 1977 (CHFDA).1'5 In response to the directive,
the Conference sued the Secretary seeking a declaration that the
CHFDA was preempted by federal law." 6 After the declaratory suit
had been commenced, the Secretary brought suit in state court seek-
ing statutory damages for noncompliance with the CHFDA."17 The
federal district court found that jurisdiction was proper, and held for
the declaratory plaintiff.1'8
On appeal, the Secretary claimed that the declaratory claim
founded in preemption was merely a defense to a potential state
claim, and that under Wycof the district court lacked federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.' '9 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Secretary's argu-
ment and affirmed the district court, distinguishing Wycof on the
basis of justiciability. 20 Whereas in W'ycoff there had been no proof
of any state action which might have caused irreparable injury, r21 in
Stein there was an actual conflict created by the declaratory suit. 22
the declaratory suit had been brought prior to the Commissioner's enforcement action." Id
(citing Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506-08 (1972)).
113 Id (citing Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1975), ajd ub.
nom. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)).
114 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979), af'dmem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
115 Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir.
1979). The CHFDA prohibited "redlining," or credit discrimination based on the character-
istics of the neighborhood surrounding the borrower's dwelling. Id See National State Bank
v. Long, 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980).
116 Conference of Fed, Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal 1979).
117 People v. West Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 220012 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 28,
1978).
118 Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
119 Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979).
120 IM at 1259.
121 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 240-41 (1952).
122 Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Citing Greenwald, the court determined that the conflicting require-
ments of state and federal regulations created an "actual justiciable
controversy" over which it had jurisdiction. 123 Thus the Ninth Cir-
cuit, although focusing its discussion on ripeness, implicitly recog-
nized that a declaratory claim of preemption raised "in the nature of
a defense"' 124 will not be barred by the Wyof dicta.12 5
IV. Probing the Operative Limits of Federal Question
Jurisdiction
f5coffa 26 and subsequent cases 12 7 have sought to ensure that fed-
eral jurisdiction not be expanded by a misapplication of the well-
pleaded complaint rule in declaratory actions. 28 By insisting that a
declaratory plaintiff not base federal jurisdiction on a federal right
asserted in the nature of a defense, these cases prevent federal courts
from allowing the declaratory remedy to upset actual, or threatened,
state court proceedings. 129
The independent viability rule, having evolved from attempts to
distinguish the Wcoff dicta, stands in contrast to Wyoff and its prog-
eny. Wyco f has been distinguished on two separate grounds which
together constitute the independent viability rule. First, rights aris-
ing under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 130 may be as-
serted offensively as well as defensively to vindicate a federal right.
Second, a controversy will "ripen" when the federal preemption issue
crystalizes.
The Ninth Circuit in Rath '3' and the Fifth Circuit in Branifl1 32
concentrated on the first aspect of independent viability; 33 both
phrased the issue differently than the standard Wycoff "test". Instead
of asking whether the declaratory claim might be in the nature of a
defense, both circuits asked whether the claim might be asserted of-
fensively, independently of the state litigation, to protect a federal
123 Id
124 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952).
125 Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1979).
126 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
127 See notes 67-69 supra.
128 See notes 50-56 and accompanying text supra.
129 See notes 58-72 and accompanying text supra.
130 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
131 Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1975).
132 Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978).
133 Rath and Brani~falso discussed the ripeness issue in detail. See notes 88, 102 & 103 and
accompanying text supra.
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right. The declaratory claims in Greenwa/d'3 4 and Stein 135 were like-
wise viable both offensively and defensively. The First Circuit in
Greenwald and the Ninth Circuit in Stein, however, focused on jus-
ticiability and distinguished W of on the basis of ripeness. Both cir-
cuits noted that the federal and state law "collisions"' 3 6 were ripe for
adjudication; the claims were therefore not dependent on any state
proceedings for viability. 37 Thus, by upholding federal jurisdiction
over declaratory claims asserted in the nature of defense, the First,
Fifth and Ninth Circuits established the independent viability rule.
The independent viability rule has expanded federal question
jurisdiction. In Rath, Branif, Greenwald and Stein, the declaratory
claims alleged that federal law preempted state law.13 8 The "pre-
emption doctrine"'1 9 is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution; 40 a claim of preemption "arises under" federal law.' 4'
The mere fact that a claim "arises under" federal law may satisfy
section 1331,142 but it does not ensure federal question jurisdiction
over the claim. Federal question jurisdiction will be improper if the
well-pleaded complaint rule is not satisfied.'t 43 Wycof effectuates the
well-pleaded complaint rule in declaratory suits, denying jurisdiction
over a federal claim if it is in effect a defense to a threatened or pend-
ing state court proceeding.t 44 The independent viability rule, how-
ever, nullifies W ffs jurisdictional barrier and opens federal
question jurisdiction to federal claims which otherwise would be
barred. Thus the independent viability rule respects the constitu-
tional and statutory "arising under" requirements 45 and violates
solely the post-FDJA J4'5coff dicta.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit decisions in
134 First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979).
135 Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979).
136 See note 13 supra.
137 See notes 109-12, 120-23 and accompanying text supra.
138 See Part III supra.
139 See note 13 supra.
140 U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
141 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). "[W]hen a federal statute condemns an act as
unlawful the extent and nature of legal consequences of the condemnation. . . are. . . fed-
eral questions. . . . Legal rules which impact significantly upon the effectuation of federal
rights. . .(are) treated as raising federal questions." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477-78
(1979) (quoting Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
142 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
143 See notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
144 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952).
145 See notes 18-37 and accompanying text supra.
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Rath146 and Stein147 despite their inconsistencies with the 4ycoff'dicta.
In neither opinion did the court discuss any of the jurisdictional is-
sues considered by the Ninth Circuit. Subject matter jurisdiction
may never be waived, and the Supreme Court had a duty to consider
the jurisdictional issues sua sponte. 11 The Supreme Court has counte-
nanced the development of the independent viability rule by decid-
ing Rath and Stein on their merits. The operative limits of federal
question jurisdiction have been expanded. 49
V. Proposed Adoption of the Independent Viability Rule in the
Federal Courts
Although the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have developed
the rule exempting a certain type of declaratory claim from the
- Wycof dicta, the majority of federal courts have adhered faithfully to
the dicta. A careful analysis of the 4ycof dicta, however, reveals that
it restricts federal jurisdiction unnecessarily. The independent viabil-
ity rule nullifies the unwarranted federal jurisdictional restrictions
imposed by W f;coJ, therefore, the rule should be uniformly adopted
in the federal courts.
The Wycof dicta seeks primarily to respect the integrity of fed-
eral question jurisdiction by limiting federal declaratory judgments
to ripe federal controversies appearing on a "hypothetical com-
plaint."' 50 This policy is advanced by Wycqff's statement that federal
courts should look to the "character of the threatened action" in ap-
plying the modified well-pleaded complaint rule.15' A strict applica-
tion of the Wycoff dicta thus bars federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over a federal declaratory claim which arises in response
to a state cause of action. 52 This construction of the well-pleaded
complaint rule may well enhance judicial convenience and jurisdic-
tional certainty.15 3 However, it reduces federal subject matter juris-
diction to less than that allowed prior to the enactment of the FDJA.
The Supreme Court in Wycoff did not discuss the relevance of
146 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
147 Conference of Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 445 U.S. 921 (1980) (memorandum
opinion).
148 Note, FederalJurisdiction over Declarator, Suits Challenging State Action, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
983, 992 n. 51 (1979); 48 U. CINN. L. REV. 150, 154 n.35 (1979).
149 See note 32 supra.
150 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
151 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952).
152 Id
153 See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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the pre-FDJA, Expare Young 154 decision. In Expare Young, the cen-
tral issue was whether the Eleventh Amendment 155 barred an action
to enjoin state officials from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional
statute. In exercising jurisdiction over the action and enjoining the
state officer, the court recognized that the plaintiff's claim was based
on federal law. 156 The Court's finding of jurisdiction is noteworthy
because, absent the injunctive action, the federal claim could arise
only as a defense to a state enforcement action. 57 Ex parte Young
establishes that, outside of specific statutory provisions, 58 a federal
court has jurisdiction to enjoin a state officer's unconstitutional inter-
ference with federal rights.' 59 Where a federal court has jurisdiction
over an action to enjoin, it may exercise jurisdiction over a corre-
sponding declaratory claim. 60 Accordingly, in the absence of Wycof
a federal court would have jurisdiction under Expare Young to enter-
tain declaratory and equitable challenges to unconstitutional state
action, even when asserted "in the nature of a defense." Therefore,
the independent viability rule has not expanded federal jurisdiction
beyond that which was allowed prior to the enactment of the FDJA.
Moreover, the employment of the independent viability rule
does not disregard the essentials of "our federalism."' 16 The power to
intervene in state proceedings is not identical to the act of interven-
tion. Th& declaratory judgment is a highly discretionary remedy; a
federal judge may, at his discretion, refuse to issue a declaratory
judgment. 62 The Court in Wycoqf nevertheless warned:
Declaratory proceedings in the federal courts against state offi-
154 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
155 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
156 Note, FederalJurisdiction over Declaratoy Suits Challenging State Action, 79 COLUM. L. REv.
983, 997 (1979).
157 Id at 997 n.84.
158 Several statutory provisions were passed subsequent to Exparte Young. These include
the Anti-Injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976); The Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342
(1976); and the Tax Injuction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
159 Note, FederalJurisdiction over Declaratogy Suits Challenging State Action, 79 COLUM. L. REv.
983, 998 (1979).
160 The FDJA states that a declaratory suit may be entertained even if coercive relief is
unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976). See note 1 supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 1264, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); S. REP. No. 1005, 7.3d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934); Steffel v. Thomp-
son, 415 U.S. 452, 466-68 (1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-16 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161 Abstention from federal intervention into state proceedings is grounded in "our feder-
alism." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971). See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Abstention has been effected
through the development of the Pul/man and ounger Abstention Doctrines.
162 As the FDJA states: "[A]ny court of the United States. . . may declare the rights and
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
cials must be decided with regard for the implications of our federal
system . . . It is the state courts which have the first and the last
word as to the meaning of state statutes and whether a particular
order is within the legislative terms of reference so as to make it the
action of the state. ... Anticipatory judgment by a federal court
to frustrate action by a state agency is even less tolerable to our
federalism. 163
An adoption of the independent viability rule in all federal circuits,
however, would not affect a federal court's discretion to abstain from
intervening in state proceedings. It is a federal court's discretion as
to the use of judicial power, and not the power itself, which enables
the smooth operation of our federal system and respects the delicate
balance between state and federal courts. 164
VI. Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court has countenanced the develop-
ment of the independent viability rule in the federal courts, it has not
relieved the tension between the new rule and the 4 ycoff dicta. The
independent viability rule does not offend federal constitutional or
statutory jurisdictional guidelines; it does not extend federal jurisdic-
tion beyond that which was cognizable before the FDJA's enact-
ment; and it does not interfere with the federal courts' broad
discretion to abstain from intervention in state proceedings. While
the rule does expand federal jurisdiction beyond the express limits set
forth in W4ycoff, it empowers federal courts to adjudicate constitution-
ally-based claims of federal preemption. This power is vital to the
full protection of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of
the United States. Until the Supreme Court openly articulates
other legal relations of any interested party. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976) (emphasis
added).
163 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952).
164 Professor Mishkin, discussing the jurisdictional questions arising when a party asks for
a declaration of federal immunity to a purported state cause of action, has written:
What [Justice Jackson in W4qycoA] seems to have ignored, though the complaint in
the case before him did ask for an injunction, was that precisely the same pattern
occurs in any suit to restrain allegedly unconstitutional state action. Insofar as his
concern is directed toward attempts to use declaratory actions to evade limitations
imposed on injuctions against state action (the specific situation before him), there
are sufficient tools available to prevent such circumvention though the case be
deemed to "arise under" national law. The existence of federal question jurisdic-
tion does not mean that a declaratory judgment must issue; the courts hAve a
broad discretion as to the entertaining of such actions.
Mishkin, The Federal "Question"in the Distn't Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 179 n. 103 (1953).
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-guidelines governing requests for declaration of constitutional immu-
nity to state actions, the federal courts should uniformly accept the
independent viability rule.
Patrick M Jo.yce
